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The recent advances in networking and the ubiquity of the Internet have enabled the emergence of cloud computing
as a viable solution for a convenient, elastic and economical usage of services. In spite of these apparent advantages, the
cloud model presents some challenges that hamper its wider adoption, most of which relate to security and privacy.
This paper provides a review of the current initiatives devised by both academia and industry for addressing the security
concerns inherent to the cloud model. Our analysis of the state of the art reveals that although initiatives such as SLA
and virtual machines monitoring, and recent development in encryption mechanisms, have contributed to addressing
some of the salient issues of security and privacy in the cloud, larger initiatives, other than standards, aiming at enabling
security transparency and a mutual auditability in the cloud remain to be seen. With this in mind, the paper proposes
some routes towards related solutions by discussing a number of desiderata for establishing a better security transparency
between a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) and a Cloud Service Consumer (CSC). Given the current reluctance of some major
businesses to embrace the trend, owing mainly to the devolution of some of the security aspects to a third party, the
authors argue that undertaking some initiatives in that direction is a key to sustaining the current momentum of the cloud.
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It has been acknowledged that the current advances in vir-
tualisation and the ubiquity and pervasiveness of high-
speed networking are driving a complete rethink of the
paradigm whereby organisations deploy and manage their
own services and infrastructures [1]. This has mainly re-
sulted in the increased popularity of service provisioning
models such as cloud services. Beside the technological
context that has made it possible, there is an economical
and performance incentive for embracing the trend. In-
deed, the complexity of today’s systems and networks, and
the cost associated with their management and mainten-
ance, has prompted the re-emergence of the old type
computing usage characterised by timesharing, usage-
based pricing and shared resources [2]. The timesharing
model arose because computers were expensive and hard
to maintain, while in contrast, modern computers and
networks are drastically cheaper, but still hard to maintain.
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medium, provided the original work is properlyoutsource, especially when one considers that computing
is now seen as a utility. Despite these benefits, security in
cloud services poses increased challenges for consumers,
since both the data and programs of the consumers may
reside in geographically different locations, yet often within
the Cloud Service Providers’ (CSPs) premises. Several
studies (including [3–5]) have pointed out that despite the
potential benefits of cloud services, security remains one
of the major concerns that hinders a large scale adoption
by big and medium-size corporations. In fact, having one’s
data stored and processed within one’s organisational ad-
ministrative domain gives the chance to select the appro-
priate protection mechanisms, and decide who may or
may not have access to the data. Once the processing and/
or storage of the data is delegated to a third party, one can
only hope that the decisions on security matters will be as
good as one would expect. This has led numerous surveys
and technical contributions to focus on the security of
cloud-based services. For instance, Subashini and Kavitha
[6] surveyed the security concerns pertaining to each of
the cloud models (Software as a Service-SaaS, Platform as
a Service-PaaS and Infrastructure as a Service- IaaS) with
a synopsis on the existing security solutions. According toss article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
y/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
credited.
Table 1 Mapping of VM’s life cycle threats and security solution [9]
Threats VM Life cycle
stage
Security solutions
NA Image definition NA




Threats 4and 5 Transportation Cryptographic protection
Threats 1–5 Storage Cryptographic protection
Threats 1, 2, 3
and 5
Deployment Encrypted boot and data partition
Custom binding
Threats 1-6 Contextualisation Custom binding
Threats 1,
3,4,5,6 and 7
Runtime Deviation from “normal”
Threats 2, 3
and 5
Undeployment VM introspection (VM memory
consistency checks
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enterprise actors, is the lack of visibility about the way
their data is stored and secured. In addition, they are con-
cerned about insider breaches, along with vulnerabilities
in the applications and systems’ availability that could lead
to loss of sensitive data and money. With respect to IaaS,
the authors highlighted it only provides basic security such
as perimeter firewall and load balancing. Thus applica-
tions moving into the cloud will need higher levels of se-
curity provided at host level. The PaaS model is said to be
prone to serve as a cover environment for hackers, as one
can easily leverage the PaaS cloud infrastructure for mal-
ware command and control and target IaaS applications
[6]. Indeed, the capability of PaaS cloud to provide an en-
vironment for full life cycle software development and
testing hides a darker side or so called “Malware as a Ser-
vice”. The key concern is that hackers, rather than running
their malicious code from local resources, will now tend
to leverage the PaaS to develop and manage malicious
codes that would ultimately take aim at resources available
on the Internet included IaaS infrastructure.
Lombardi and Di Pietro [7] followed in a similar path
by first investigating the security issues pertaining to the
cloud models before elucidating the key requirements for
a protection system. Their contribution, referred to as Ad-
vanced Cloud Protection System (ACPS), is based on se-
curity extensions of the Linux Kernel Virtual Machine.
The ACPS purports to actively protect the integrity of the
guest Virtual Machines (VMs) and the distributed com-
puting middleware, against intruders and malware, by
allowing the host to monitor guest virtual machines and
infrastructure components [7].
In a similar way, the security in multi-tenant software
platforms, resulting from the PaaS model, has been the ob-
ject of the analysis conducted by the survey of Rodero-
Merino et al. [8]. Here the authors explored the technical
vulnerabilities within the underlying platform that support
multi-tenancy in the PaaS model, namely container sys-
tems such as Java and .NET. The authors noted that isola-
tion of codes from different Cloud Service Consumers
(CSCs) within a PaaS was necessary to limit the impact of
a faulty code on other adjacent applications. In fact, as
noted earlier, the code executed by the PaaS system may
be untrusted, either because they are malware code devel-
oped and/or running on the PaaS, or because best practices
on safe coding were not followed leading to vulnerabilities
that could be exploited. As a result it is imperative for the
CSP of a PaaS to identify and implement the necessary
mechanisms that can enforce security policies aiming to
decrease the risks involved in running such code.
The comprehensive work by Vaquero et al. [9] has been
devoted to the examination of the security threats relating
the IaaS model, in particular those induced by the virtual-
isation and multi-tenancy aspects of the cloud. From theinitial stages of a VM life cycle (definition of the OS) via
the creation and customisation of the VM, to its transpor-
tation to the hypervisor, storage, deployment and runtime,
the authors proceeded to mapping each step of the VM’s
life cycle to known threats, namely those identified by the
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), along with existing solu-
tions as can be seen in Table 1. The authors subsequently
concluded that access control and encryption mechanisms
were the techniques relied upon for dealing with security
concerns resulting from virtualisation. The aforemen-
tioned threats are further described in Section 2.
To all the above, we can add the extensive body of work
on security of cloud services that has largely focused upon
debating the peculiarities of security in cloud services (ex-
ample of [10–12]), and describing the security challenges
and some solutions associated to the model [11–19].
What has been missing so far, especially with respect to
the surveys conducted, is an analysis of how known secur-
ity concerns along with their existing solutions contribute
respectively, in exacerbating or improving the mutual
trust between the CSP and CSC. This is not to overlook
the colossal security challenges that come with the cloud.
Instead, we argue that for the model to gain in momen-
tum, it is imperative to dedicate some research on the se-
curity transparency and help boost the confidence of its
users on a critical security matters that may be devolved
to a third party.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold: First we ex-
plore the security initiatives currently tailored for enhan-
cing the trust relationship in the cloud environment. This
paper provides a review of such initiatives emanating from
both academia and industry. Secondly, the paper discusses
how such initiatives have had limited success in appropri-
ately addressing the salient need for security transparency
between the two main stakeholders i.e. the CSP and the
CSC, before describing a number of desiderata that may
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ing and establishing a trusted cloud environment.
The paper is organised as follows: Section II provides
background information on cloud security concerns. Sec-
tion III reviews some trusted cloud computing platforms
and VM monitoring methods. Section IV is devoted to the
review of efforts aiming at establishing security transpar-
ency through the definition and monitoring of a Service
Level Agreement (SLA). In Section V, we analyse the role
of governance in making the cloud more security trust-
worthy. Section VI analyses the current efforts in data
encryption and their potential to make the cloud more
trustworthy. In Section VII, we discuss how the aforemen-
tioned initiatives fare in delivering security transparency
in the cloud, before laying down a number of desiderata
that may be considered for strengthening such a transpar-
ency. Section VIII concludes the paper and discusses our
future work.
Security and privacy concerns in cloud services
Security-related issues within the cloud differ little from
traditional IT solutions, since cloud computing itself is a
result of combining existing computing techniques, such
as virtualisation, grid computing, and service-oriented
computing. According to Chen et al. [10], few cloud com-
puting security issues are fundamentally new or funda-
mentally intractable, as many of the problems often cited
(such as downtime, data loss, and password weaknesses)
already received attention dating back to the time-sharing
era. Nonetheless, the authors stressed that two facets are
to some degree new and fundamental to cloud computing:
the complexity of multi-party trust considerations, and
the subsequent need for mutual auditability. Both aspects
have, to some extent, have contributed to exacerbating the
perception of insecurity in the cloud realm.
Indeed, in the cloud, the data and the mechanisms ne-
cessary for its processing may reside in the CSP’s prem-
ises. This makes security within the cloud stringently
dependent on the provider’s security; prompting the ar-
gument that “cloud computing is about gracefully losing
control while maintaining accountability” [20, 21]. The
stored information may be subject to the legislation of
the country where it is stored physically. As the data
processing of cloud services can be carried out in geo-
graphical locations that are not even necessarily known
by the CSCs, security and privacy management is challen-
ging. Some privacy legislation requires that the critical
data should reside only in a specific country, addressed by
the legislation. In general, the privacy threats to the CSC’s
information can be different depending on the privacy
terms of the service. In addition to ensuring the privacy of
the stored and/or processed information, any information
generated and stored regarding the actual transaction it-
self may need to be confidential.The security responsibilities of both the CSP and the
CSC will basically depend upon the cloud service model.
In the case of SaaS, the service security and the liability
expectations of the service provider are contractually
specified in a formal document. In the case of PaaS or
IaaS, it is the responsibility of the consumer’s system ad-
ministrators to securely manage the service, while some
of the security responsibilities (namely those relating the
security of the underlying platform and infrastructure)
are liable to the provider.
The deployment model of a cloud service affects the
choice of security mechanisms. Indeed, the security needs
are expected to increase in scale as one moves from a pri-
vate to a public cloud setting. This is mainly because the
context of a private cloud differs very little from a trad-
itional information system, especially if the private cloud
is managed by the very same company that uses the ser-
vice. In contrast, the hybrid and public cloud models
increase such security concerns, as the models expose the
CSC’s information to a pool of individuals either sharing
the same resources or external to the cloud. In the hybrid
and public cloud, special attention should be paid to the
confidentiality of the transactional information, in addition
to the storage and processing of the consumer’s informa-
tion. In fact, either maliciously or accidentally, cloud pro-
vider’s employees can tamper with or leak a company’s
data; an action that can severely damage the reputation or
finances of a company [22]. Other security concerns that
have been thoroughly discussed in the literature include
those related to the multi-tenancy aspect of cloud services,
reliability and availability. The multi-tenancy concerns
relate to attacks from other consumers, who may be com-
petitors or simply hackers, co-located on the same infra-
structure, such as servers, hard disks, virtual machines.
Similarly, the reliability and availability of cloud services
are dependent on those of the Internet, since access to
those services is made through an Internet connection.
Thus, downtimes of such services can occur even in the
case of large-scale providers such as Amazon and Rack-
space [23].
Another way of looking into the security concerns in
the cloud model is through the analysis of the threats it
faces. A commonly referenced list of threats for cloud is
that of the CSA [16], as depicted in Table 2. It is import-
ant to note that a revised list of threats is provided by
the CSA [24]. However such a list remains a mere
rebranding of some of the threats (for instance threat 5
is split into two threats Data breach and Data loss; and
threat 7 known as unknown security profile is renamed
Insufficient due diligence) while the few added threats
can be seen as obvious consequences of the lists pro-
posed in the previous CSA document [16] (for example,
the newly added threat of Denial of service for the cloud
is a result of Shared technology issue whereby a lax in
Table 2 Overview of cloud related threats as defined by the Cloud Security Alliance [16, 24]
CSA defined tsreats Description
Threat 1: Abuse and nefarious use of
cloud computing
Malicious code authors, spammers and other criminals can abuse the relative anonymity behind some of
current cloud services.
Threat 2: Insecure interfaces and APIs A set of software interfaces are utilized by the CSPs for CSC interaction of the services. The security and
availabilty of cloud services depends upon the security of the basic interfaces, such as Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs).
Threat 3: Malicious insiders The threat of malicious insider is amplified for cloud services due to the convergence of Information
Technology (IT) services and customers under a single management domain.
Threat 4: Shared technology issues CSPs deliver services in a scalable way. Some underlying component parts of the cloud infrastructure were
not originally designed for that environment, and can potentially cause security problems. The main
concern is that a single vulnerability or misconfiguration can lead to a compromise across an entire
provider’s cloud
Threat 5:Data loss or leakage The threat of data compromise increases in the cloud, due to the number of interactions between risks and
challenges which are either unique to cloud, or more dangerous because of the architectural or operational
characteristics of the cloud environment.
Threat 6: Account or service hijacking Phishing, fraud and exploitation of software vulnerabilities can be used for account or even service
hijacking.
Threat 7: Unknown Security Profile The reduction of cost of ownership induced by the cloud also resulted in more complex analysis of a
company’s security posture. More tenants imply increased complexity in detecting who is using the
infrastructure and how this is done.
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overall cloud service infrastructure, with impact on sev-
eral CSCs. Consequently, the threats hereafter reviewed
will be principally based on the previous version which
is complete enough to comprehend the core security is-
sues related to cloud based services. As we aim to ex-
plore the angle of security transparency between the
CSP and the CSC, it is relevant to analyse each of those
threats in view of identifying those contributing one way
or the other to the fear of the CSC to embrace the cloud.
Only after this, one could elaborate on the set of actions
undertaken both by academia and industry towards re-
ducing, if not eliminate those concerns.
Threat 1 (Abuse and nefarious use of cloud comput-
ing), is one that has been gaining in proportion recently.
Indeed, there is now evidence that botnets are operating
within the cloud, as criminals try to amplify the magni-
tude of their attack by leveraging the technology offer by
the cloud, while remaining undetectable at the victim’s
computer [25]. This is well exemplified by the “Amazon
Zeus botnet” incident involving Amazon EC2’s infrastruc-
ture [26], whereby cybercriminals, by initially hacking into
a service hosted by the Amazon cloud infrastructure, were
able to install command-and-control infrastructure with
the aim of infecting client computers and stealing their
banking credentials. Importantly this threat is of great
concern for companies or individuals within or outside of
the cloud, given that the computation powers or amenities
of the cloud could be leveraged for targets beyond the
CSP’s infrastructure.
Threat 2 (Insecure interfaces and APIs): Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (APIs) provide a thorough mapping ofsoftware or a service. The benefit of publicising APIs by the
CSP is two-fold [27]:
1. To expose the available features of cloud components
to their customers
2. To enable customer(s) to formulate their deployment
re-architected, if needed, for better mutual benefits.
The downside is that this also forms a body of useful
information on the actual features and architecture of
the service, which may be exploited for a malicious pur-
pose, especially when harbouring some technical flaws.
It is therefore imperative that CSPs strictly limit the in-
formation displayed on the functionalities of their ser-
vice through usage of such technique as encryption,
abstraction and encapsulation.
Threats 3–5 relate to the issues of data security in the
cloud, namely its Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
(CIA). Such threats may be due to malicious insider ac-
tions (unscrupulous cloud employees or an ill-intentioned
tenants co-located on the same physical resource); or
owing to the CSC being unable to obtain his data as a re-
sult of a termination of the CSP activities. These threats
have been at the forefront of reasons behind the slow and
cautious move of companies toward the cloud. The good
news, however, is that researchers from both academia and
industry are starting to devise solutions, including new en-
cryption methods, for ensuring data confidentiality and in-
tegrity security. We expand on this later in Section 6.
Threat 6 (Account or service hijacking) relates to the fact
that the security of the cloud service is only as good as at
its weakest link. For instance, a vulnerability at a tenant
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vice, as witnessed by the Amazon Zeus botnet incident.
Although such a threat can be very cumbersome to con-
tain (as it depends on many factors and actors of the
cloud), actions such as user education about security and
VM monitoring are often relevant safeguards.
Threat 7 (Unknown Security Profile) relates to the diffi-
culty to determine ones’ security posture in the cloud con-
text, given that its security level depends on multiple
players including the concerned CSC; the CSP or chain of
CSPs which is not always known to the CSC; and Other
CSCs. To help the CSC keep an eye on the service security
and performance, and have some sort of confidence on
the actual service utilised, Service Level Agreement (SLA)
and monitoring, and security audits are often performed.
We further elaborate this aspect in Section IV.
Table 3 provides a summary of the most common se-
curity solutions adopted against the threats that impact
on the adoption of the cloud model.
In the following sections, we discuss the initiatives that
are being devised towards fostering more security trans-
parency between the level of visibility into security pol-
icy and operations offered by the CSP to the CSC [28].
Those set of initiatives conducive to enhancing the trust
relationship in the cloud environment have come mainly
in the form of virtual machines monitoring; usage of en-
cryption; certification, audits and monitoring of Service
Level Agreement (SLA).
The usage of trusted cloud computing platforms
and monitoring of virtual machines
Besides the debate on whether the cloud service is worth
the hype surrounding it, some initiatives focusing on the
usage of a trusted platform and the monitoring of Vir-
tual Machines, have emerged as potential solutions for
addressing the issue of security and privacy in the cloud.
Santos et al. [22] proposed the Trusted Cloud Com-
puting Platform (TCCP), which aims to ensure the con-
fidentiality and integrity of the data and computation
undertaken by the provider. Using a program associated
to TCCP, a customer may be able to detect whether theTable 3 Cloud security threats and some related solutions based on
Threats affecting the wider adoption
of the cloud
Some related security solutions
Threat 1 Customer CSC’s network traffic intros
Threat 2 Security Analysis of API Encryption, A
Threat 3 Supply chain audit including human
Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP)
Threat 4 VM monitoring and cloud audit, Acc
Threat 5 API, Access control, Encryption and k
Threat 6 VM monitoring, Use of Trusted Cloud
Threat 7 Security certification, Audits, SLA modata or computation has been tampered with or been
accessed even by the provider. Subsequently, the cus-
tomer may decide on whether to terminate a VM should
they notice any abnormality. In particular, the TCCP
needs to guarantee that the VM is launched on a trusted
node and that the system administrator is unable to in-
spect or tamper with the initial VM state as it traverses
the path between the user and the node hosting it. The
TCCP approach builds upon a traditional trusted plat-
form, such as TERRA [29], to ensure the integrity and
confidentiality in the context of multiple hosts.
Another initiative that uses the concept of trusted plat-
form is the Private Virtual Infrastructure (PVI) proposed
by Krautheim [30]. This has suggested a means to allow
monitoring in the cloud by combining the trusted plat-
form module (TPM) and a Locator Bot that pre-measures
the cloud for security properties, securely provisions the
datacentre in the cloud, and provides situational aware-
ness through continuous monitoring of the cloud security.
In this approach, security appears as a shared responsibil-
ity between the provider and the consumer. Thus, the
SLA between the client and the provider is critical to de-
fining the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved
in using and providing the cloud service.
The authors in [31] argued that the dependability of
cloud services may be attained through the quantification
of security for intensive compute workload clouds to fa-
cilitate provision of assurance for quality of service. They
subsequently defined seven security requirements which
include: Workload state integrity, Guest OS Integrity,
zombie protection, Denial of Service attacks, malicious re-
source exhaustion, platform attacks and backdoor protec-
tion. Unfortunately the paper does not provide any
evidence of effort towards quantification of security as it
claimed. Moreover it remains unclear as to how informa-
tion relating those security requirements may be conveyed
to the provider and consumer alike.
De Chaves et al. proposed an initiative to private cloud
management and monitoring called PCMONS [32]. The
authors argued that despite the peculiarity of cloud ser-
vices compared to traditional legacy systems, existing toolsour survey and the CSA documents [16, 24]
pection VM monitoring,
ccess Control encapsulation, abstraction
resource hiring procedure, Security certification, Audits, Use of Trusted
ess control, SLA enforcement for patching and vulnerability remediation
ey management, Use of Trusted Cloud Computing Platform (TCCP)
Computing Platform (TCCP), Access control and authentication
nitoring
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tems can be reused in cloud computing management.
PCMONS is based on a centralised architecture with the
following features [32]: (a) a Node Information Gatherer,
which is responsible for gathering local information on a
cloud node; (b) Cluster Data Integrator, an agent that
gathers and prepares the data for the next layer (the moni-
toring data integrator); (c) a Monitoring Data Integrator
that gathers and stores cloud data in the database for
historical purposes, and provides such data to the Config-
uration Generator; (d) a Virtual Machine (VM) Monitor
that sends useful data from the VM to the monitoring sys-
tem; (e) a Configuration Generator for retrieving informa-
tion from the database; (f) a monitoring Tool Server that
receives monitoring data from different resources (e.g., the
VM Monitor); and finally (g) a database where the data
needed by the Configuration Generator and the Monitor-
ing Data Integrator are stored. Given PCMONS was de-
veloped to respond to the needs of management in private
cloud, the need of establishing mutual trust between the
provider and the consumer does not arise. Nonetheless,
based on our experience in working with similar systems,
the proposed architecture may present some interesting
features that could easily be expanded to deliver mutual
auditability and security transparency and mutual audit-
ability. One way of achieving this would be to consider the
monitoring data integrators consoles as part independent
service whereby CSCs can, upon the formal specification
of their requirements be provided with relevant informa-
tion on the security of the service they are using.
Overall, it can be said that the research community has
moved from debating whether the cloud is a mere hype to
devising some tangible initiatives for resolving security is-
sues. Unfortunately the current efforts on trusted cloud
computing platforms and monitoring of Virtual Machines
have mainly been driven by the need to foster a better
management of security for the CSP provider rather than
addressing the complexities of multi-party trust consider-
ations (particularly those related to security), and the en-
suing need for mutual auditability. In fact monitoring of
VMs is meant to be conducted by and for the CSP.
Security transparency through SLA management
According to the interview study conducted in [33], se-
curity transparency is emphasized as the main security
need in the cloud by security experts. For Rak et al., the
mutual trust between a provider and a customer should
be considered only in context of an SLA management
[34]. Using a cloud-oriented API derived from the mO-
SAIC project (http://www.mosaic-project.eu/), the au-
thors built up an SLA-oriented cloud application that
enables the management of security features related to
user authentication and authorization of an IaaS Cloud
Provider. This gives the opportunity for the customer toselect from amongst a number of security requirements
templates, the one that may be appropriate for the na-
ture of his/her application before the provider can set up
the configuration of the concerned node accordingly. As
noted by the authors, the consideration of SLA in the
management of the cloud security provides the con-
sumer with formal documentation about what he/she
will effectively obtain from the service. Meanwhile, from
the provider point of view, SLAs are a way to have a
clear and formal definition of the requirements that the
application must respect. However, the initiative by Rak
et al. [34], does not go far enough to incorporate means
for monitoring and reporting on the fulfilment of such
SLA to the consumer. An extension of the work of Rak
et al. [35] in the context of the EU FP7 project Specs
(http://specs-project.eu/) considered the provision of a
platform for providing a security services based on SLA
management.
The SLA@SOI project [36] also followed in the path
of SLA management in service oriented architectures,
which includes cloud technology. The monitoring of
SLAs expressed in the SLA specification language of
SLA@SOI requires the translation of these SLAs into
operational monitoring specifications (i.e., specifications
that can be checked by a low level monitor plugged into
the SLA@SOI framework). The SLA monitoring in
SLA@SOI relies on EVEREST+ [37], which is a general-
purpose engine for monitoring the behavioural and qual-
ity properties of distributed systems based on events
captured from them during the operation of these sys-
tems at runtime. The properties that can be monitored
by EVEREST are expressed in a language based on Event
Calculus [38], called EC-Assertion. Similarly, Chazalet
discusses SLA compliance checking in cloud environ-
ments and uses JMX (Java Management Extensions)
technology in the prototype implementation [39]. Their
checking approach allows separating concerns related to
the probes, information collection and monitoring and
contract compliance checking.
The negotiation of SLA in the context of federated
cloud has also been the focus of research initiatives. Such
initiatives range from simulation frameworks purporting
to help in selecting the optimal combination of cloud ser-
vices which better meet SLA requirements [40] to the op-
timal negation of SLA using multi-objective genetic
algorithms [41]. In a similar way, some recent work on ac-
countability in the cloud has started to emerge through
projects such as A4CLOUD (http://www.a4cloud.eu),
whereby researchers are trying to devise models that can
help put in place the set of mechanisms that would ensure
cloud providers are hold accountable should there be a
breach of SLA or a security incident that can be traced
back to a lax in their security. In the context of A4Cloud
the concept of transparency in the broader sense is dealt
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ested in further comprehending the scope and diversity of
existing efforts on SLA-based monitoring of cloud security
can refer to the taxonomy of Petcu [43].
The major problem with the adoption of SLA manage-
ment as a means to enhance security transparency is pri-
marily its practicality. Indeed the academic notion of SLA
appears to be far more extensive than it is in reality. Dur-
ing the course of this work, the authors have approached
a number of CSPs based in Luxembourg with the aim to
get a glimpse on the set of items that were included in
their SLA specifications. Most often, such documents
were restricted to aspects such as allocated bandwidth,
storage capacity, etc.., while the only security aspect in-
cluded was related to service availability. Clearly, the items
included in those specifications were those the companies
were confident they could deliver on. Their argument on
the most pressing and challenging issues such as security
was that stringent and redundant mechanisms were in
place for its guarantee, as witnessed by some of their se-
curity certification.
Security certification and audits
Amongst the threats listed in Tables 2 and 3, Threat 7 is
perhaps the one that cannot be resolved with technical
means alone as it involves mutual trust considerations be-
tween the CSP and the CSC. Furthermore, as already men-
tioned, the security level of a cloud service is dependent on
several factors, including the security of the CSP and all
other CSCs using the service. In the cloud, such a com-
plexity can be further increased due to the federation of an
application’s component across different cloud providers
[44] and to the fact that very often the complete chain of
CSP-CSC involved in the provisioning of one’s service is
not always known to the CSC.
In their effort to reduce the fears of the CSCs and distin-
guish themselves from competitors by promoting their
service as one that is secure, CSPs have often turned to
certifications as a way of swaying CSCs. Reasons for this
include the lack of metrics and sometimes resources from
the CSC to adequately assess the cloud services. As such
certification from a third party organization has been
hailed by proponents as the ultimate means of promoting
trust and transparency in the cloud ecosystem, which is a
key to its wider acceptance [45]. For instance, certification
to ISO/IEC 27001 is valued in the industry, as it provides
a holistic framework for appreciating how well a company
manages its information security. The standard empha-
sises the need for organisations to have clear means of un-
derstanding their security needs. Additionally it is meant
to assist them in implementing controls to address risks
facing their business and monitoring, reviewing and im-
proving the performance and effectiveness of the Informa-
tion Security Management Systems (ISMS). Importantly,the authors in [45] have also highlighted the need for cer-
tification scheme to be affordable to avoid smaller com-
pany having the carry those expenses in the price of their
service delivery and thus become ultimately uncompetitive
against their bigger rivals.
Following the argument that providers should rely more
on a certification from a governing or standardised institu-
tion that stipulates the provider has established adequate
internal security controls that are operating efficiently, the
Cloud Security Alliance has made a number of effort to-
wards the provision of clear guidelines towards controlling
security risks in the cloud [18]. The CSA guidance is made
up of 99 control specifications covering such area as:
Compliance, Governance, Facility, human resource and
Information security, Legal matters, Operations, Risk and
Release management, Resiliency and the security architec-
ture. The individual controls identified within the guideline
emanate from well-established standards and guidelines
pertinent in both the context of traditional Information
Systems and the cloud, covering a wide range of domains
including the IT Governance (COBIT), the banking and fi-
nancial domain (PCI-DSS and BITS), Government (NIST
SP800-53 and FedRAMP), Health care (HIPAA) and cross-
domain standard for the management of information se-
curity systems (ISO/IEC27001). Recently, the CSA has put
forward the idea of a three-levelled certification scheme
that would rely on the compliance to its set of security
guidance and control objectives [16–18, 46]. According to
the CSA each level will provide an incremental level of
trust to CSP operations and a higher level of assurance to
the CSC.
The first of such levels (which it must be stressed is a
mere self-assessment exercise) requires each CSP to sub-
mit a report on the CSA to assert its level of compliance
to the advocated best practices. The second level, re-
ferred to as CSA STAR CERTIFICATION, is meant to
provide a third-party independent assessment conducted
by an approved certification body under the supervision
of the CSA and BSI. The third level will extend the
STAR CERTIFICATION in view of providing a continu-
ous monitoring based certification.
Similarly, the Certified Cloud Service of TÜV Rheinland,
runs a certification scheme which is based on CSPs com-
pliances on the most essential information security stan-
dards such as ISO 27001 basic protection standards issued
by the German Federal Office for Information Technology
and ITIL [47].
It is clear that standardization and certification bodies
are rushing to make a footprint in the certification market
related to cloud based services. Although the intention lies
in helping to make an informed judgment about the qual-
ity of a given CSP, companies with interest in adopting the
cloud could be swamped and confused by the sheer num-
ber of standards and their actual scope. In anticipation to
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logne in Germany has suggested a taxonomy of cloud
certification whereby commonly agreed structural charac-
teristics of cloud service certifications could be adopted as
a baseline for classifying certification schemes depending
on their core purpose [48].
The adoption of certification as a way of making a
statement about the reliance of the security of one’s ser-
vice has reinforced the importance of audits for the
cloud model. Audits are meant to provide a third party
independent assessment of the posture of the security.
Until autumn 2011, the SAS70 was a standard audit ap-
proach for service companies to use with their customers
instead of customers individually auditing the services
companies [49]. The actual purpose of the standard was
primarily aimed to assess the sufficiency and the effective-
ness of the security controls of the CSP. The standard was
superseded by SSAE16 (www.ssae16.com), which stands
for Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements
No. 16. The rationale for such a changed was to align the
reporting standard of US based companies to that of the
international standard ISAE3402 (http://isae3402.com/).
One of the core difference between the two standards
rests on the fact that the evaluated company is bound to
provide a written statement about the accuracy of the de-
scription of their system and the corresponding time
frame during which such an assessment has been made.
What becomes apparent after analyzing the different
audit standards available is that they rely in a large part on
the words and assessment of the CSP. Such information
cannot be guaranteed to be immune from bias. For in-
stance, the CloudAudit initiative from the CSA (http://
cloudaudit.org/CloudAudit/Home.html) is seeking to pro-
vide a common API for CSPs to specify their assertion, as-
sessment and assurance. Such information is meant to be
made readily available to the CSCs and also allow the
latter to make comparisons between potential providers
based on their security. Given the CSP has often a greater
control over the security in the cloud, with very little visi-
bility (if any) for the CSC, the frequency and independence
of such audits is paramount along with the appropriate
reporting of the findings to the CSC. Thus automated and
continuous audits will be more appropriate, especially when
considering the evolving nature of the cloud infrastructure.
The importance and difficulty with encryption of
data as means of establishing assurance in the
cloud
Encryption has been seen as a natural solution for ensur-
ing the integrity and confidentiality of data in the cloud.
Indeed, it was meant to guarantee that data in transit or
stored by cloud providers are not tampered with, or
looked at, by a third party (whether internal to the CSP
or external). However, until recently, encryption was nosilver bullet to this problem. Indeed, the peculiarity of
the cloud model (namely the devolution of the data stor-
age and management to the CSP), means it is hard to
readily apply traditional cryptographic methods for data
security and privacy protection [50, 51].
One of the well-known challenges relating the effective
usage of encryption in the cloud is key management. Ac-
cording to the Cloud Security Alliance, three main im-
peratives need to be met [17]. The first concerns the
security of the key stores in order to avoid compromis-
ing all encrypted data. Then comes the actual policing of
the access to those keys; to ensure only legitimate users
get access to the keys, and the implementation of a clear
policy to ensure keys are not stored by the entity meant
to be using them. Finally, ensure that safe backups exist
for data recovery in case of key loss. Nonetheless there
are signs that things are moving on that side as the ad-
vancement on order preserving encryption and database
systems have facilitate the emergence of application
where the cryptographic key remains at the client [52].
Some authors, such as Anthes and Zhu et al., have also
highlighted the difficulty of effectively applying encryp-
tion in a cloud realm [1, 53]. According to these authors,
it all comes down to the difficulty to process encrypted
data without a-priori having to decrypt them, and the
necessity to download a local copy of data - which can
be an expensive transaction, especially for large-size files.
The good news, however, is that research in cryptog-
raphy is now starting to catch up, even if an efficient
and full applicability to complex real life cloud applica-
tions is still years ahead according to practitioners [1].
Interestingly, some of the big players in the cloud mar-
ket are leading those initiatives.
The work of IBM’s Craig Gentry on a fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme, which uses ideal lattices, has
provided a hope of processing some data without initially
having to decrypt them [54]. Using a homomorphic en-
cryption in general, the result of computations on the
encrypted data is itself the encryption of the computation
on the plain text. A fully homomorphic encryption ex-
tends partial homomorphic encryption by supporting the
homomorphic computations of both addition and multi-
plication on the plain data, making it more powerful.
Since the actual scheme does not decrypt itself, the entity
handling the data does not have any knowledge of the
original data. A recent application of the work on fully
homomorphic encryption include the initiative of López-
Alt et al. in [55] who introduced the notion of on the fly
multiparty computation or MPC. This is achieved using a
new type of encryption scheme referred to as multikey
FHE, which is capable of operating on inputs encrypted
under multiple, unrelated keys. Although fully homo-
morphic encryption is pertinent to storage at an untrusted
CSP, the computational cost is considered so important
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away [1].
Microsoft’s Kamara and Lauter have defined an archi-
tecture that combines some cryptographic primitives in
view of providing secure cloud storage [56]. The precept
of their virtual private storage service is that the cloud
service provider is not completely trustworthy. Using
such a service on top of a public cloud purports to
ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data. The
virtual private storage service proposed is made of three
main components: the data processor, the data verifier
and the Token generator. The data processor encrypts
and encodes the data and metadata, with a variety of
cryptographic primitives such as symmetric encryption
scheme, attribute-based encryption and searchable en-
cryption scheme. In the event that the consumer wishes
to retrieve the data, the token generator creates a token
using a tag which, references a certain file. The token is
then sent to the cloud service provider who will carry
out the retrieval of the corresponding encrypted files.
The integrity of the data can be verified by invoking the
data verifier. The authors refer to this mechanism as a
proof of storage; that is, a protocol executed between a
client and a server with which, the server can prove to
the client that it did not tamper with its data.
Juels et al. proposed a protocol called Proof of Retrieval
(POR) that helps users verify that large files are not deleted
or modified prior to retrieval, without actually download-
ing the files [50]. The technique proposed consists of
encrypting a given file and embedding a set of randomly-
valued check blocks or sentinels. The data owner then
challenges the entity archiving the data by specifying the
positions of a collection of sentinels and asking it to return
the associated sentinel values. The modification or dele-
tion of some portion of the file will, with some probability
value, affect the sentinels leading to an inaccurate re-
sponse. A similar approach to POR is the Provable Data
Possession (PDP) introduced by Atheniese et al. in [57].
The PDP also uses a probabilistic proof technique to allow
the verification that an untrusted server stores a client’s
data as well as ensuring the authenticity of the latter. It
adopts a scheme known as Homomorphic linear Authenti-
cator (HLA). Using the HLA, a file is subdivided into a
number of blocks, which are then tagged in a way that, for
a given vector generated as challenge for a proof of pos-
session, the server can homomorphically construct a tag
for authenticating the value of the polynomial resulting
from combining the components of such a vector and the
file’s blocks. Several Extensions of the approach have since
followed including those presented in [58, 59].
The development of techniques for verifying the integ-
rity of data in a cloud domain has also been the focus of
recent academic works. The work by Zhu et al., relies on
the principle of the POR for ensuring the integrity andprivacy of the data, but addresses also the need for such
an audit to be efficient and less costly to the consumer
[53]. In that respect, the authors have suggested the use
of a Third Party Auditor (TPA) which can afford to peri-
odically audit the outsourced data and make them avail-
able on-demand to the consumer; thereby avoiding the
burdensome and cost associated to the data validation
by downloading them locally. In practical terms, the data
owner is assigned a secret key that is used to pre-
process the file, which is partitioned into a certain num-
ber of blocks. A set of public verification information is
then generated and stored at the TPA, before the actual
file and some verification tags are transmitted to the
CSP. When a request for check is issued by the data
owner, the TPA uses a protocol of proof of retrievability,
to issue a challenge to audit (or check) the integrity and
availability of the outsourced data using the public verifi-
cation information. Importantly, the overall architecture
proposed by the authors can be implemented by the
TPA without involving the data owner.
The work by Wang et al. has also sought to resolve
the privacy concerns in third party auditing of data in-
tegrity in cloud services through the usage of the TPA
[51]. The audit of the integrity still relies on homo-
morphic encryption. Beside the actual technique of en-
suring privacy while resorting to a TPA, Wang et al.
have included a batch technique that would enable the
TPA to gain in efficiency when having to process numer-
ous simultaneous request of integrity check.Discussion and desiderata for a trusted cloud
service
There is no doubt the current effort by security re-
searchers, particularly in encryption, is promising to
change the way that medium and large corporations per-
ceive the security of cloud services. This is likely to be-
come more so when the processing of the encrypted data
without initially having to access them, as purported by
fully homomorphic encryption schemes, becomes a more
practical and viable solution. As cloud users can never be
sure about the actual location of their data at a given time,
a technique such as the Provable Data Possession (PDP),
can prove useful for determining whether specific storage
servers possess the data. Still, more remains to be done to
achieve a good level of security transparency that should
help boost the confidence of the consumer on a security
matter that is more and more devolved to a third party,
often the CSP. Although some of the responsibilities to
guarantee the security of cloud services rest with the ser-
vice provider, it is also the duty of the CSC to ensure
proper evidence of security is demonstrated by the CSP
prior to sending sensitive and confidential information
data in the cloud [15].
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has been on the form of an agreement between the CSP
and the CSC, on top of the usual SLA. Such an agree-
ment often considers the cloud service providers liable
in case a security incident that occurs in their infrastruc-
tures is not promptly reported to the consumers. Still,
such a reporting may not be timely enough for the
consumer as, the incident impacts may have already
materialised in the midst of the CSC’s service by the
time of the reporting. The alternative approach adopted
by the CSPs (and also advocated by entities such as the
Cloud Security Alliance, ENISA and NIST) is that the
CSPs should rely more on a certificate from a governing
or standardised institution that stipulates the CSP has
established some adequate internal security controls that
are operating efficiently. The caveat remains that being
certified by a standardisation body does not guarantee
that one’s security will remain in a good posture indefin-
itely. Hazards in the system’s environment may arise;
intentional or unintentional modification of some of the
security mechanisms configurations may occur and lead
to the security mechanisms being ineffective. Moreover,
as multi-tenancy allows several customers to be hosted
on the same underlying infrastructure, traditional audits
and reviews of a CSC to give the expected level of assur-
ance becomes less practical [4], especially given that
could lead to security breaches of collocated CSCs when
an untrustworthy security auditor is involved [60]. The
work of Dolitszcher et al. [61] provides some hope in ad-
dressing such a gap. Indeed, the security audit as a
service (SAaaS) approach proposed by the authors resort
to the usage of multi-agent system (MAS) for conduct-
ing the audit of virtual machines allocated to cloud con-
sumers dynamically. This data interpretation is achieved
using a Security Service Level Agreements (SSLA) policy
modelling engine, which allows the definition of moni-
toring events and consideration of business process
flows. As agents are renowned for their autonomy and
flexibility, the usage of autonomous agents appears to be
suitable for the identification of anomalies in such a
highly scalable environment as the cloud. In addition to
this, current efforts such as encryption, SLA and Virtual
machines monitoring need to be complemented by se-
curity assurance activities [62–65] that is, the continuous
probing and reporting on the adequacy (correctness,
effectiveness, efficiency and non-vulnerability) of the
security mechanisms put in place by the CSP. Further-
more, some desiderata would need to be observed for
achieving a more comprehensive Security Transpar-
ency and Mutual Audit (STMA) in the cloud. For each
of those points, thereafter enumerated, we provide some
initial directions that could be further investigated by the
research community and the industry. Such desiderata
include:1. STMA based ranking of cloud based services:
This would involve establishing a systematic
approach that would help assess and rank cloud
providers based on the adequacy of their security
and the level of security transparency and audit
offer to the CSC.
2. Engineering cloud services with STMA in mind:
A point that is closely related to the one above
discussed relates the elaboration of a conceptual
modelling and design framework tailored to reflect
the cloud realm. Amongst others the idea would
be to devise interactive software engineering methods
that allows capturing the expectations of the CSC in
terms of STMA while allowing the CSP to suggest a
design and strategy to meet such requirements.
3. Architectural design and method for enforcing security
transparency and mutual auditability:
While the first two desiderata pertain to knowledge
and tools that are relevant while contemplating to
outsource to the cloud, this one relates to methods
and the technology require for (i) ensuring no
nefarious use of the service is being undertaken
by unscrupulous CSCs;(ii) continuously gathering
evidence to support security, compliance and other
quality of service related claim by a certain CSP
and; (iii) sharing security related information with
the CSC.
STMA based ranking of cloud based services
The existence of a standardized ranking scheme is essen-
tial to ensure the informed selection of a CSP that meets
the CSC’s STMA expectations. The challenge for achiev-
ing this resides in the definition of a ranking model and
process that will enjoy a broader acceptance. An initia-
tive in that direction includes the Complete-Auditable-
Reportable or CARE approach proposed in our previous
publication [65]. The approach helps to determine the
adequacy of a CSP sponsored security using STMA
criteria. According to CARE, the level of security trust-
worthiness of a given CSP is dependent on three factors,
namely: (a) the assurance that the CSP may deliver a ser-
vice that meets the CSC’s security and privacy need,
(b) whether such security can be adapted to address con-
cerns identified during planned and frequent audits, and
(c) the transparency of information regarding security of
the cloud service conveyed to the CSC.
A similar initiative was suggested by Pauley [66] through
the proposal of a Cloud Provider Transparency Scorecard
(CPTS). Pauley’s scorecard-based assessment of CSPs’
transparency consists in scoring them on four different
areas including security, privacy, external audits/certifica-
tions, and service-level agreements, using a set of ques-
tions provided within the ENISA and the CSA’s guidelines.
Relevant information on the CSP’s standing on the four
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about the CSP’s past security woes is used as input for
scoring individual questions. Boolean responses collected
for each question can then be summed up to provide an
overall score for transparency or a relative/percentile based
score per area assessed.
For a real take up of any STMA based ranking of CSP,
that enjoys the support of future CSC’s, especially those
from the business world and government agencies, a
standardization body or government led initiative could
be preferable. That is not to cast aside efforts under-
taken by the research and academic community. Instead,
we argue that Government and standardization bodies
hold more sway over the commitment of the business
world to adopt such a classification scheme. This is spe-
cially the case, if a certain level of STMA was laid by a
regulation as a minimum mandatory requirement that a
cloud based service ought to have for being considered
by a given sector of business or government agencies.
Engineering cloud services with STMA in mind
Rather than considering STMA as an afterthought,
which could be a source of conflicts (especially if some
features or components need to be added to enable the
automation of the audit and sharing of the security re-
lated information), an efficient way could be to consider
STMA throughout the modeling and design process of
Cloud based services. Furthermore it is clear that STMA
requirements will be different in their specificities, as
well as bearing different priorities in the eyes of different
CSCs. Similarly CSPs will have different strategies in
meeting those STMA requirements. Consequently, cus-
tomizing the way in which STMA requirements and
related solutions are specified appears to be more appro-
priate. For instance, an STMA-driven cloud service en-
gineering could systematically support, on the one hand,
the cloud consumers in specifying their STMA related
requirements. On the other hand, providers would be
able, through the methodology, to better appreciate what
and how components should be put in place to deliver a
service that meets the STMA requirements of a particu-
lar CSC.
Architectural design and method for enforcing
mutual auditability and security transparency
Because security transparency and mutual auditability
imply the possibility for the CSC or its auditors to probe
the security of the CSP, it is essential that research is
undertaken on the development of new architectures
that would enable such introspection and the secure
flow of the related information from the cloud node
hosting the CSC’s application or data to the relevant lo-
cation for forensic analysis and decision making. The
area of event computing [67, 68] offers some potentialthat could be exploited in that context. In fact, events
provide a powerful construct to capture current state of
a system (service) and deviations from expectation and
to predict future security or QoS related issues [67, 68].
Additionally a well-defined architecture can support event
based monitoring in ensuring the prompt dissemination
of events’ occurrence to the interested parties who would
subsequently make judgment on the course of action to
adopt. Amongst others, it may be a way to hold cloud pro-
viders accountable for a security breach that may have
stemmed from a weakness in their security; a breach of
SLA or other escrows between the two parties. The set of
patterns and the detection algorithms associated could
also constitute a powerful tool for a cloud provider con-
cerned with abusive and nefarious use of its service by cli-
ents. Efficiently leveraging the power of events for the
purpose of STMA in the cloud will entail further investi-
gation in mainly three areas as depicted in Fig. 1:
i) Specifying STMA requirements using event constructs.
A prerequisite for an effective use of event computing
in enforcing STMA in cloud services includes: the
definition of atomic events structure coupled with the
adoption of a pattern specification language that is
expressive enough to capture the realm of events of
interest. While patterns of events [67] (including event
counters, conjunction, disjunction and sequences of
events) could be readily reuse or extended to reflect the
complexity of events of interest to the cloud
stakeholders, existing event specification languages
such as ETALIS [69], TESLA [70] and YALES [71]
are amongst the most expressive languages that can
be adopted for the specification of event patterns
pertinent to STMA. Furthermore, given most STMA
related events would be related to security, candidate
format for representing atomic events of interest
may include the Extensible Configuration Checklist
Description Format - XCCDF [72] and the Intrusion
Detection Message Exchange Format- IDMEF (http://
www.rfc-base.org/txt/rfc-4765.txt), both being an
XML based format. While IDMEF is intended to be
a standard data format that automated intrusion
detection systems can use to report alerts about
events that they deem suspicious, XCCDF is used
to specify security checklists and benchmarks
amongst others. The overarching purpose of the format
is to provide a uniform expression of security
checklists, benchmarks, and other configuration
guidance, and thereby foster more widespread
application of good security practices. Another
advantage of the format includes the reuse of some
existing Security Content and Automation Protocol
(SCAP) [73] tools for the detection of atomic
events.
Fig. 1 High level Architecture for STMA enforcement
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within the cloud infrastructure (CI) with the purpose
of detecting atomic events specified within the
STMA event specification platform that we refer to
as Event Designer. The elaboration and management
of the detection agents may be performed using
JADE platform [74]. Challenges associated to this
include ensuring that software agents entrusted with
probing and retrieving the security information are
not corrupted at the CSP’s, or that the collected
information does not fall in the wrong hands. What
information may be shared with a given consumer
and its extent should be contractually stipulated in a
STMA based agreement that could be part of a global
service level agreement between the two parties.
iii)Upon the detection of atomic events by the embedded
agents, another layer of processing would be required
to determine whether a pattern of events specified by
either the CSC or CSP within an event specification
platform (STMA Event designer) has materialized.
Such a detection layer could intertwine both a specific
architecture for atomic event processing such as
Storm [75] along with algorithms for detecting each
of the patterns specified by the CSC/CSCP.
Conclusion
As the cloud paradigm has been gaining momentum, so
have the concerns about its security and privacy. Nonethe-
less, the security community has been devising solutions
that may help to thwart some of the security challenges.
In this vein of effort, novel encryption mechanisms, SLA
and virtual machines monitoring have been amongst the
most researched topics. However, what can be taken from
this analysis of the current security practices is that thecurrent research has often overlooked the importance of
mutual trust considerations and the need for mutual
auditability in the cloud.
By shedding more light on the current security prac-
tices and discussing on how they fare in addressing the
lack of security transparency and mutual auditability in
the cloud, the authors hope to stimulate more research
in that direction. The desiderata discussed in the previ-
ous section of the paper give a flavour of some of the
challenges that await researchers keen on filling the
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